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"The blood was taken from his coat, and the evidence as to
it was produced by another witness.
' 48
The later case' involved the same facts. The court held
the evidence about the blood was admissible. Commenting
on the Allen case, they said it draws a line of "demarcation
between cases where accused was compelled to allow a
physical exhibition while on the witness stand, and those
where the physical evidence, obtained from him, was testi-
fied to by other witnesses."45
WHERE PRINCIPLES OF RESTITUTION ARE
INAPPLICABLE TO ENCROACHMENT BY
BUILDING ON ADJOINING LAND
Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co.'
This suit was entered in the Circuit Court of Baltimore
City by the complainant, the Dundalk Holding Co., to
restrain the defendant, Andrew J. Easter, an adjoining
property owner, from enforcing a judgment obtained in an
ejectment suit, to assess the value of the strip of land occu-
pied by the complainant, and to order defendant to convey
the strip to the complainant. In 1945 the defendant, who
was then the owner of a large undeveloped tract of land on
Belair Road, sold a frontage of 250 feet to the complainant.
The latter erected a moving picture theater, the southwest
wall of which, by innocent mistake, encroached on the
defendant's land from .36 to .95 of a foot. This theater wall
was 13 inches thick, made of bricks and cinder blocks; the
roof was constructed of steel beams and gypsum steel
planks; and the ceiling of metal lathe and plaster. The
defendant apparently was not made aware of the encroach-
ment until after the progress of the work had caused some
of the top soil on his own land to be cut away. In 1947 the
defendant had filed suit in ejectment in the Superior Court
of Baltimore City, and in 1949 the Court had rendered
judgment in his favor. This judgment had been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in 1950.2 Thereupon the com-
plainant filed the bill in equity cited above, alleging that
the value of the strip occupied was only $150, whereas
"Ibid, 444.
" Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A. 2d 289 (1948).
" Ibid, 645.
'86 A. 2d 404 (1952).
2 Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 73 A. 2d 877 (1950).
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the cost of removing the wall would be more than $60,000,
due to the necessity of replacing the footings, building a
new wall, and of changing all the seats in the theater. The
Circuit Court of Baltimore City, France, J., entered a decree
declaring the exact value of the land occupied to be $500,
but refused to grant an injunction or any other relief
prayed. The defendant, the owner of the land encroached
upon, appealed and this decree was reversed by the Court
of Appeals on the ground that, though it was a nullity and
could not affect the judgment in the ejectment suit, it still
might create a cloud on defendant's title and therefore
should be expunged. 8
The complainant had relied upon the decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals delivered in 1874 by Chief
Judge Bartol in Union Hall Association v. Morrison.' In
that case the appellant erected a building wholly upon a-
vacant lot. The appellee, an adjoining owner, discovered
from a survey a number of years later that the land on
which the building was erected was included within his
tract, and he recovered a judgment in ejectment against the
appellant. Thereupon the latter filed a bill in equity, and,
though he was not entitled to relief under the doctrine
of equitable estoppel since appellee had not knowingly
allowed him to erect the building on his land, the Court
decided that the appellant was entitled to relief as a bona
fide possessor under the doctrine of the civil law. The
Court held that the appellee had the option either: (1) to
accept payment for the lot estimated at its fair value with-
out the improvements, or (2) to hold the lot and to pay for
the improvements to the extent of additional value which
they had conferred upon the lot, and in default of such
payment the same should be a lien on the property.
The radical distinction between that case and the instant
case was pointed out by the Court of Appeals. The Union
Hall case was held not to be precedent for the case under
discussion, since the complainant here made no improve-
ments which enhanced the value of defendant's lot. The
Court declared that no court of law or equity has authority
to compel a landowner to surrender his property to another
person in exchange for a sum of money; to do so would be
a deprivation of property without due process of law in
violation of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
SRupra, n. 1, 407.
Union Hall Association v. Morrison, 39 Md. 281 (1874).
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of the United States. It should be stated parenthetically
that the Court of Appeals presumably regarded the doc-
trines of estoppel or mutual mistake as inapplicable to this
case. As far as can be found from the record, the parties
were dealing at arm's length, with an innocent mistake on
the builder's side only.
The Court of Appeals in the Union Hall case based its
opinion squarely upon a decision of Judge Story in the
Circuit Court for Maine in Bright v. Boyd,5 where the facts
were analogous. Judge Story's decree (that the improve-
ments innocently made were a lien on the hand, which, if
not paid, would cause the land to be sold) was apparently
the model for the Court of Appeals in the Union Hall case.
Judge Story stated that his decision was the clear result
of the Roman law, and the Maryland Court of Appeals
remarked: "This careful and well considered decision meets
with our entire approval, and rests upon such plain prin-
ciples of equity, that we have no hesitation in adopting it,
as applicable to the case before us."' Both of these cases
entitled the bona fide possessor to affirmative relief in
equity by way of compensation or lien on the other party's
land because the structures erected were permanent im-
provements that enhanced the value of the land. Where
the expenditures of the occupant, no matter how great, have
not made the premises more valuable to the owner, the
latter is never under equitable obligation to make compen-
sation.7 To be an improvement or betterment, the expendi-
ture must be both permanent and beneficial, and in the in-
stant case it can be seen that the erection of the theater
wall certainly did not meet the latter qualification. If any-
thing, it impaired the value of the property.
Even where the expenditures undeniably enhance the
value of the true owner's land, however, the Bright v.
Boyd - Union Hall line of cases, which govern the law in
Maryland, are in the minority. Outside of Maryland this
5 Bright v. Boyd, 4 Fed. Cas. 134 (1843). This case involved a bona fide
purchaser without notice of defect in his title who made valuable improve-
ments on the true owner's land. As in the Union Hall case he was given
affirmative relief in equity, after a judgment at law had been obtained
against him.
6 Supra, n. 4, 296.
'27 Am. Jur. 273, Improvements, Sec. 19. See also Annotation, 81 Am. St.
Rep. 164. Anything that enhances the value of the property is an "improve-
ment"; Parker v. Wuistein, 48 N. J. Eq. 94, 21 A. 623 (1891). But ordinary
repairs cannot be classed as permanent improvements; McKenzie v. Bacon,
41 La. Ann. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889). A wall out of the true course is not an
improvement to property, but an injury to it; Leavison v. Harris, 12 Ky.
Law Rep. 488, 14 S. W. 343 (1890).
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minority view has been fully adopted only in a few juris-
dictions.' Elsewhere, if not modified by statute, the common
law rule prevails to the effect that whoever puts improve-
ments upon the real property of another does so at his peril,
regardless of the good faith factor. This rule was supposed
to be founded in good policy, inasmuch as it induces dili-
gence in the examinations of titles and prevents intrusions
upon and appropriations of property of others.'
The harshness of the common law rule has been modified
by equity only to a limited extent. In the majority of juris-
dictions, where no statute governs, equity courts will not
grant positive relief of the type granted in Bright v. Boyd
and the Union Hall case; relief is granted only in an an-
cillary, auxiliary manner, where the other party has in-
voked equity jurisdiction and the bona fide possessor is
the defendant, unless there is fraud or estoppel involved. 10
Thus where the landowner invokes the aid of equity to
obtain injunctive relief for the removal of an encroaching
structure, he will only be granted relief upon condition that
he compensate the other party to the extent that the value
of his property was enhanced by the improvements." This
was based on the familiar maxim that he who seeks equity
must do equity. Similarly where the landowner brings an
action for rents or mesne profits against his encroaching
neighbor, the latter is entitled to a set-off against the dam-
ages to the extent of the value of his improvement. 2 Thus,
though the courts of equity introduced an innovation to
the common law rule, the relief afforded was of a limited,
negative character.
Writing in 1839, Judge Story observed: "The Civil Law
seems to have proceeded upon a far broader principle of
natural justice. For by that law any bona fide possessor...
was allowed a privilege or lien for such meliorations."' 8
It was this civil or Roman law rule that Story seized upon
four years later as a basis for his decision in Bright v.
"Notes to RF3STATEmSINT OF REsITUTIoN, Sec. 42; Hardy v. Burroughs,
251 Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200 (1930) ; Hatcher v. Briggs, 6 Ore. 31 (1876) ;
Herring v. Pollard's Ex'rs., 4 Humph. 362 (Tenn. 1843) ; Murphy v. Benson,
245 S. W. 249 (Tex. 1922).
181 Am. St. Rep. 166-167.
20 Annotation 174 A. L. R. 10, 137.
UWarwick v. Harvey, 158 Md. 457, 148 A. 592 (1930). One purchasing
land in ignorance of a mortgage thereon is entitled to compensation for
improvements in foreclosure proceedings.
2Notes to RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTIoN, p. 31 and 27 Am. Jur., Improve-
ments, supra, n. 7.
32 SmORy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (2nd Ed., 1839), Sec. 1239.
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Boyd.14 And it was this case that established the minority
line of cases in this country. How far the minority view
would have made its way unaided by the legislative arm is
difficult to say, but the Restatement of Restitution states
that Story's view permitting restitution would probably
have prevailed in the end but for the prevalence of the
so-called Betterment Statutes. 8 These statutes, in varying
degrees, codified the minority rule and give one who has
color of title, or who, in good faith, enters upon and places
permanent improvements on another's land, the right to
recover for such improvements in a direct affirmative pro-
ceeding against the owner. The Betterment Acts have be-
come the predominant statutory system of the country,
though there is no such statute in Maryland. 6 The addi-
tion of the jurisdictions relying on Story's "minority view"
and those under the Betterment Acts probably produces an
actual majority, leaving the common law rule with its nega-
tive equitable modification in the minority as far as the
practical aspects of relief are concerned.
There are certain further limitations to both the
"minority view" of Story and the Betterment Acts which
should be observed. It has been held that an injunction
(sought by the landowner) will not be barred, regardless
of hardship, where one locates such portion of his building
without any survey, although he has been warned not to
encroach on the neighboring property." Good faith and
lack of knowledge is, of course, a minimum essential to
relief, and it has been held in this State as recently as
1946 that one who expends money on another's property,
with knowledge or notice of the true state of the title has
no claim to be reimbursed and has no lien. 8 Yet in spite
of these limitations the rule in Maryland is more liberal
than that obtaining in most jurisdictions.' In this State a
defendant in an ejectment suit is not necessarily precluded
"Supra, n. 5, 135.
Supra, n. 12, 29.
"81 Am. St. Rep. 168. For cases construing these statutes, see ibid and
Notes to Restatement, supra, n. 12, 30.1 Kershishian v. Johnson, 210 Mass. 135, 96 N. E. 56 (1911).
Goldberg v. Ford, 188 Md. 658, 53 A. 2d 665 (1947). This case involved
a contractor engaged in strip-mining under a contract with a lessee of some
coal land. He sought a ien for work done in laying bare certain veins of
coal, but relief was denied because he bad knowledge as to the actual owner-
ship of the land. The court cited two earlier cases of Bryan v. Councilman,
106 Md. 380, 67 A. 279 (1907) and Warwick v. Harvey, aupra, n. 11, for the
rule that there must be three concurrent essentials : 1. He must have held
possession under color of title; 2. His possession must have been adverse
to the title of the true owner; 3. He must have acted in good faith.
ISupra, n. 18, 664.
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from going into equity after judgment, because he did not
interpose a plea by way of equitable defense in the original
action. The Court of Appeals has recognized that some-
times it is almost impossible to properly set up a claim by
plea on equitable grounds in an action at law so as to do
justice between the parties.20
The foregoing review of authorities should reveal the
weakness of the complainant's case in Easter v. Dundalk
Holding Co. Under neither the minority view, followed in
Maryland, nor under the Betterment Statutes did he have
the slightest ground for relief, though the hardship involved
was great. He failed because, in the eyes of the Court of
Appeals, the wall that he had erected was a mere injurious
encroachment and not an improvement or melioration upon
the adjoining land. He would have been entitled to relief
had his innocent mistake been much greater in degree -
that is if he had located the theater entirely on the defen-
dant's land. But the possibility of this occurring, with the
good faith factor present, is extremely slim in urbanized,
well-developed areas. The relief of the kind discussed
would seem to be confined, by the force of circumstances,
to controversies arising over large, undeveloped tracts of
real estate. The constitutional issue was likewise a fatal
stumbling block to the complainant. It will be observed
that even the liberal or minority view does not provide for
a forced sale of the adjoining landowners tract when such
a mistake is made. The relief provided is alternative or
optional: the landowner can either compensate the bona
fide occupier to the extent that the value of his land is en-
hanced or he will have the value of such improvement im-
pressed as a lien upon his land. By granting this option
there is no deprivation of property without due process of
law. Because of the very nature of his case, the complainant
in the instant case could not ask for this optional type of
relief because the theater wall was obviously of no value
to the other party.
0Stump v. Warfleld, 104 Md. 530, 553, 65 A. 346 (1906). This case cites
Union Hall v. Morrison, supra, n. 4, as "another illustration of a case where
the defendant, in an action of ejectment, should not be prohibited from
afterwards going into equity ... He should be permitted to first have the
title determined at law."
See Md. Code, Art. 75, for the rules of pleading generally.
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